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Abstract
Memory hard functions (MHFs) are an important cryptographic primitive that are used to
design egalitarian proofs of work and in the construction of moderately expensive key-derivation
functions resistant to brute-force attacks. Broadly speaking, MHFs can be divided into two
categories: data-dependent memory hard functions (dMHFs) and data-independent memory
hard functions (iMHFs). iMHFs are resistant to certain side-channel attacks as the memory
access pattern induced by the honest evaluation algorithm is independent of the potentially
sensitive input e.g., password. While dMHFs are potentially vulnerable to side-channel attacks
(the induced memory access pattern might leak useful information to a brute-force attacker),
they can achieve higher cumulative memory complexity (CMC) in comparison than an iMHF.
In particular, any iMHF that can be evaluated in N steps on a sequential machine has CMC at
most O
(
N2 log logN
logN
)
. By contrast, the dMHF scrypt achieves maximal CMC Ω(N2) — though
the CMC of scrypt would be reduced to just O (N) after a side-channel attack.
In this paper, we introduce the notion of computationally data-independent memory hard
functions (ciMHFs). Intuitively, we require that memory access pattern induced by the (ran-
domized) ciMHF evaluation algorithm appears to be independent from the standpoint of a
computationally bounded eavesdropping attacker — even if the attacker selects the initial in-
put. We then ask whether it is possible to circumvent known upper bound for iMHFs and build
a ciMHF with CMC Ω(N2). Surprisingly, we answer the question in the affirmative when the
ciMHF evaluation algorithm is executed on a two-tiered memory architecture (RAM/Cache).
We introduce the notion of a k-restricted dynamic graph to quantify the continuum between
unrestricted dMHFs (k = n) and iMHFs (k = 1). For any ǫ > 0 we show how to construct
a k-restricted dynamic graph with k = Ω(N1−ǫ) that provably achieves maximum cumulative
pebbling cost Ω(N2). We can use k-restricted dynamic graphs to build a ciMHF provided that
cache is large enough to hold k hash outputs and the dynamic graph satisfies a certain property
that we call “amenable to shuffling”. In particular, we prove that the induced memory access
pattern is indistinguishable to a polynomial time attacker who can monitor the locations of
read/write requests to RAM, but not cache. We also show that when k = o
(
N1/ log logN
)
, then
any k-restricted graph with constant indegree has cumulative pebbling cost o(N2). Our results
almost completely characterize the spectrum of k-restricted dynamic graphs.
1 Introduction
Memory hard functions (MHFs) [ABMW05, Per09] are a central component in the design of pass-
word hashing functions [BDK15], egalitarian proofs of work [DN92], and moderately hard key-
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derivation functions [Per09]. In the setting of password hashing, the objective is to design a function
that can be computed relatively quickly on standard hardware for honest users, but is prohibitively
expensive for an offline attacker to compute millions or billions of times while checking each pass-
word in a large cracking dictionary. The first property allows legitimate users to authenticate in
a reasonable amount of time, while the latter goal discourages brute-force offline guessing attacks,
even on low-entropy secrets such as passwords, PINs, and biometrics. The objective is complicated
by attackers that use specialized hardware such as Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs)
or Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs) to significantly decrease computation costs by
several orders of magnitude, compared to an honest user using standard hardware. For example,
the Antminer S17, an ASIC Bitcoin miner exclusively configured for SHA256 hashes, can compute
up to 56 trillion hashes per second, while the rate of many standard CPUs and GPUs are limited
to 200 million hashes per second and 1 billion hashes per second, respectively.
Memory hard functions were developed on the observation that memory costs such as chip
area tend to be equitable across different architectures. Therefore, the cost of evaluating an
ideal “egalitarian” function would be dominated by memory costs. Blocki et al. [BHZ18] argued
that key derivation functions without some form of memory hardness provide insufficient defense
against a economically motivated offline attacker under the constraint of reasonable authentica-
tion times for honest users. In fact, most finalists in the 2015 Password Hashing Competition
claimed some form of memory hardness [FLW14, BDK15, JAA+15]. To quantify these memory
costs, memory hardness [Per09] considers the cost to build, obtain, and empower the necessary
hardware to compute the function. One particular metric heavily considered by recent cryptanaly-
sis [AB16, ABP17, ABH17, AB17, BZ17] is cumulative memory complexity (CMC) [AS15], which
measures the amortized cost of any parallel algorithm evaluating the function on several distinct
inputs. Despite known hardness results for quantifying [BZ18] or even approximating [BLZ19] a
function’s CMC, even acquiring asymptotic bounds provide automatic bounds for other attractive
metrics such as space-time complexity [LT82] or energy complexity [RD17, BRZ18].
Data-Dependent vs. Data-Independent Memory Hard Functions. At a high level, mem-
ory hard functions can be categorized into two design paradigms: data-dependent memory hard
functions (dMHFs) and data-independent memory hard functions (iMHFs). dMHFs induce memory
access patterns that depend on the input, but can achieve high memory hardness with potentially
relatively easy constructions [ACP+17]. However, dMHFs are also vulnerable to side-channel at-
tacks due to their inherent data dependent memory access patterns [Ber05]. Examples of dMHFs
include scrypt [Per09], Argon2d [BDK16] and Boyen’s halting puzzles [Boy07]. On the other hand,
iMHFs have memory access patterns that are independent of the input, and therefore resist cer-
tain side-channel attacks such as cache timing [Ber05]. Examples of iMHFs include 2015 Password
Hashing Competition (PHC) winner Argon2i [BDK15], Balloon Hashing [BCS16] and DRSam-
ple [ABH17]. iMHFs with high memory hardness can be more technically challenging to design,
but even more concerning is the inability of iMHFs to be maximally memory hard.
Alwen and Blocki [AB16] proved that the CMC of any iMHF running in time N is at most
O
(
N2 log logN
logN
)
, while the dMHF scrypt has cumulative memory complexity Ω(N2) [ACP+17],
which matches the maximal amount and cannot be obtained by any iMHF. However, the cumulative
memory complexity of a dMHF can be greatly decreased through a side-channel attack, if an
attacker has learned the memory access pattern induced by the true input. Namely, a brute-force
attacker can preemptively quit evaluation on a guess y once it is clear that the induced memory
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access pattern on input y differs from that on the true input x. For example, the cumulative
memory complexity of scrypt after a side-channel attack is just O (N).
Ideally, we would like to obtain a family of memory hard functions with cumulative memory
complexity Ω(N2) without any vulnerability to side-channel attacks. A natural approach would
be some sort of hybrid between data-dependent and data-independent modes, such as Argon2id,
which runs the MHF in data-independent mode for N2 steps before switching to data-dependent
mode for the final N2 steps. Although the cumulative memory complexity is the maximal Ω(N
2)
if there is no side-channel attack, the security still reduces to that of the underlying iMHF (e.g.,
Argon2i) if there is a side-channel attack. Hence even for a hybrid mode, the cumulative memory
complexity is just O
(
N2 log logN
logN
)
(or lower) in the face of a side-channel attack. Thus in this paper
we ask:
In the presence of side-channel attacks, does there exist a family of functions with Ω(N2)
cumulative memory complexity?
1.1 Our Contributions
Surprisingly, we answer the above question in the affirmative for a natural class of side-channel at-
tacks that observe the read/write memory locations. We introduce the concept of computationally
data-independent memory hard functions to overcome the inability of data-independent memory
hard functions to be maximally memory hard [AB16] without the common side-channel vulnera-
bilities of data-dependent memory hard functions [Ber05]. Our constructions work by randomly
“shuffling” memory blocks in cache before they are stored in RAM (where the attacker can observe
the locations of read/write requests). Intuitively, each time MHF.Eval(x) is executed the induced
memory access pattern will appear different due to this scrambling step. The goal is to ensure that
an attacker can not even distinguish between the observed memory access pattern on two known
inputs x 6= y.
Towards this goal we define k-restricted dynamic graphs as a tool to quantify the continuum
between dMHFs and iMHFs. Intuitively, in a k-restricted dynamic graph G = (V = [N ], E) we
have parents(v) = {v − 1, r(v)} where the second (data-dependent) parent r(v) ∈ Rv must be
selected from a fixed (data-independent) restricted set Rv ⊆ V of size |Rv| ≤ k. When k = 1
the function is an iMHF (the parent r(v) ∈ Rv of each node v is fixed in a data-independent
manner) and when k = N the function is an unrestricted dMHF — scrypt and Argon2d are both
examples of unrestricted dMHFs. Intuitively, when k is small it becomes easier to scramble the
labels Rv in memory so that the observed memory access patterns on two known inputs x 6= y are
computationally indistinguishable.
We then develop a graph gadget that generates a family of ciMHFs using k-restricted graphs.
Using this family of ciMHFs, we characterize the tradeoffs between the value of k and the overall
cumulative memory cost of k-restricted graphs.
Impossibility Results for Small k. Since k-restricted graphs correspond to iMHFs for k = 1,
and it is known that cc(G) = O
(
N2 log logN
logN
)
for any family G of iMHFs [AB16], then one might
expect that it is impossible to obtain maximally memory hard ciMHFs for small k. Indeed, our
first result shows that this intuition is correct; we show that for any k = o
(
N1/ log logN
)
, then any
family of k-restricted graphs G with constant indegree has cc(G) = o(N2).
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Theorem 1.1 Let G be any family of k-restricted dynamic graphs with constant indeg(G). Then
cc(G) = O
(
N2
log logN
+N2−1/2 log logN
√
k1−1/ log logN
)
.
Thus for k = o
(
N1/ log logN
)
, we have cc(G) = o(N2).
We prove this result in Theorem 3.2 and Corollary 3.3 in Section 3 by generalizing ideas from the
pebbling attack of Alwen and Blocki [AB16] against any iMHF to k-restricted dynamic graphs
graphs. The pebbling attack of Alwen and Blocki [AB16] exploited the fact that any constant
indegree DAG G is somewhat depth-reducible e.g., we can always find a set S ⊆ V (G) of size
e = O
(
N log logN
logN
)
such that any path in G − S has length at most d = N
log2 N
. The attack then
proceeds in a number of light phases and balloon phases, where the goal of light phase i is to place
pebbles on the interval [ig + 1, (i+ 1)g], for some parameter g to be optimized. At the same time,
the attacker discards pebbles on all nodes v unless v ∈ S or unless v is a parent of one of the next
g nodes [ig + 1, (i + 1)g] that we want to pebble. Once light phase i is completed, balloon phase i
uses the pebbles on S to recover all previously discarded pebbles. Note that balloon phase i thus
promises that pebbles are placed on the parents of the nodes [(i + 1)g + 1, (i + 2)g], so that light
phase i+ 1 can then be initiated and so forth.
One key difference is that we must maintain pebbles on all gk nodes u ∈ ⋃v∈[ig+1,(i+1)g]Rv that
are “potential parents” of the next g nodes [ig + 1, (i+ 1)g]. The total cost of the pebbling attack
is O
(
eN + gkN + N
2d
g
)
, which is identical to [AB16] when k = 1 for (e, d)-reducible DAGs. In
general for small values of k, the dynamic pebbling strategy can still achieve cumulative memory
cost o(N2) after optimizing for g.
Maximally Hard k-restricted dMHF. In Section 4, we show how to construct a k-restricted
dynamic graph for k = O (N1−ǫ), which has cumulative pebbling cost Ω(N2) for any constant
ǫ > 0. Intuitively, our goal is to force the pebbling strategy to maintain Ω(N) pebbles on the
graph for Ω(N) steps or pay a steep penalty. In particular, we want to ensure that if there are
o(N) pebbles on the graph at time i then the cumulative pebbling cost to advance a pebble just
2k = O (N ǫ) steps is at least Ω(N2−ǫ) with high probability. This would imply that the pebbling
strategy either keeps Ω(N) pebbles on the graph for Ω(N) steps or that the pebbling strategy pays
a penalty of Ω(N2−ǫ) at least Ω
(
N
k
)
= Ω(N ǫ) times. In either case the cumulative pebbling cost
will be Ω(N2).
One of our building blocks is the “grates” construction of Schnitger [Sch83] who, for any ǫ > 0,
showed how to construct a constant indegree DAG Gǫ that is (e, d)-depth robust graph with e =
Ω(N) and d = Ω(N1−ǫ). Our second building block is the superconcentrator [Pip77, LT82] graph.
By overlaying the DAG Gǫ with a superconcentrator, we can spread out the data-dependent edges
on the top layer of our graph to ensure that (with high probability) advancing a pebble 2k = O (N ǫ)
steps on the top layer starting from a pebbling configuration with o(N) pebbles on the graph requires
us to repebble an (e, d)-depth robust graph with e = Ω(N) and d = Ω(N1−ǫ). This is sufficient
since Alwen et al. [ABP17] showed that the cumulative pebbling cost of any (e, d)-depth robust
graph is at least ed.
Open Question: We emphasize that we only show that any dynamic pebbling strategy for our
k-restricted dynamic graph has cumulative cost Ω(N2). This is not quite the same as showing that
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our dMHF has CMC Ω(N2) in the parallel random oracle model. For static graphs, we know that
the CMC of an iMHF is captured by the cumulative pebbling cost of the underlying DAG [AS15].
We take the dynamic pebbling lower bound as compelling evidence that the corresponding MHF
has maximum cumulative memory cost. Nevertheless, proving (or disproving) that the CMC of
a dMHF is captured by the cumulative cost of the optimal dynamic pebbling strategy for the
underlying dynamic graph is still an open question that is outside the scope of the current work.
ciMHF Implementation Through Shuffling. The only problem is that the above k-restricted
dynamic graph is actually a data-dependent construction; once the input x is fixed, the memory
access patterns of the above construction is completely deterministic! Thus a side-channel attacker
that obtains a memory access pattern will possibly be able to distinguish between future inputs.
Our solution is to have a hidden random key K for each separate evaluation of the password hash.
The hidden random key K does not alter the hash value of x in any manner, so we emphasize that
there is no need to know the value of the hidden key K to perform computation. However, each
computation using a separate value of K induces a different memory access pattern, so that no
information is revealed to side-channel attackers looking at locations of read/write instructions.
Let L be a set of the last N consecutive nodes from our previous graph construction, which we
suppose is called G0. We form G by appending a path of length N to the end of G0. We introduce
a gadget that partitions the nodes in L into blocks B1, B2, . . . , BN/k of size k each. We then enforce
that for i ∈ [N ] and j = i mod k, the ith node in the final N nodes of G has a parent selected
uniformly at random from Bj+1, depending on the input x. Thus to compute the label of i, the
evaluation algorithm should know the labels of all nodes in Bj+1.
We allow the evaluation algorithm to manipulate the locations of these labels so that the output
of the algorithm remains the same, but each computation induces a different memory access pattern.
Specifically, the random key K induces a shuffling of the locations of the information within each
block of the block partition gadget. Thus if the size of each block is sufficiently large, then with
high probability, two separate computations of the hash for the same password will yield distinct
memory access patterns, effectively computationally data-independent. Then informally, a side-
channel attacker will not be able to use the memory access patterns to distinguish between future
inputs.
In fact, this approach works for a general class of graphs satisfying a property that we call
“amenable to shuffling”. We characterize the properties of the dynamic graphs that are amenable
to shuffling in Section 5 and show that k-restricted dynamic graphs that are ameanble to shuffling
can be used in the design of MHFs to yield computationally data-independent sequential evaluation
algorithms.
Theorem 1.2 For each DAG G that is amenable to shuffling, there exists a computationally data-
independent sequential evaluation algorithm computing a MHF based on the graph G that runs in
time O (N). (Informal, see Theorem 6.2.)
We believe that our techniques for converting graphs that are amenable to shuffling to ciMHFs may
be of independent interest.
Finally, we provide a version of our dMHF with Ω(N2) cumulative memory complexity that
is amenable to shuffling. Combining this maximally hard k-restricted dMHF using a DAG that is
amenable to shuffling with Theorem 1.2, we obtain a maximally hard ciMHF.
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Theorem 1.3 Let 0 < ǫ < 1 be a constant and k = Ω(N ǫ). Then there exists a family G of
k-restricted graphs with cc(G) = Ω(N2) that is amenable to shuffling.
We prove Theorem 1.3 in Section 6, introducing the necessary formalities for computationally data-
independent memory hard functions and the underlying systems model. Our results in Theorem 1.1
and Theorem 1.3 almost completely characterize the spectrum of k-restricted graphs. In fact, for
a graph G drawn uniformly at random from our distribution G in Theorem 1.3 and any pebbling
strategy S, not only do we have E
G∼G
[cc(S,G)] = Ω(N2), but we also have cc(S,G) = Ω(N2) with
high probability.
2 Preliminaries
We use the notation [N ] to denote the set {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}. For two numbers x and y, we use x ◦ y
to denote their concatenation.
Given a directed acyclic graph (DAG) G = (V,E) and a node v ∈ V , we use parentsG(v) =
{u : (u, v) ∈ E} to denote the parents of node v. We use ancestorsG(v) =
⋃
i≥1 parents
i
G(v) to
denote the set of all ancestors of v— here, parents2G(v) = parentsG (parentsG(v)) and parents
i+1
G (v) =
parentsG
(
parentsiG(v)
)
. We use indeg(v) = |parents(v)| to denote the number of incoming edges into
v and define indeg(G) = max
v∈V
indeg(v). Given a set S ⊆ V , we use G − S to refer to the graph
obtained by deleting all nodes in S and all edges incident to S. We use depth(G) to denote the
number of nodes in the longest directed path in G.
Definition 2.1 A DAG G = (V,E) is (e, d)-reducible if there exists a subset S ⊆ V of size |S| ≤ e
such that any directed path P in G of length d contains at least one node in S. We call such a set
S a depth-reducing set. If G is not (e, d)-reducible, then we say that G is (e, d)-depth robust.
For a DAG G = (V = [N ], E), we use G≤i to denote the subgraph of G induced by [i]. In other
words, G≤i = (V ′, E′) for V ′ = [i] and E′ = {(a, b) ∈ E | a, b ≤ i}.
The Parallel Random Oracle Model. We review the parallel random oracle model (pROM),
as introduced by Alwen and Serbinenko [AS15]. There exists a probabilistic algorithm AH that
serves as the main computational unit, where AH has access to an arbitrary number of parallel
copies of an oracle H sampled uniformly at random from an oracle set H and proceeds to do
computation in a number of rounds. In each round i, AH maintains a state σi along with initial
input x. AH determines a batch of queries qi to send to H, receives and processes the responses to
determine an updated state σi+1. At some point, AH completes its computation and outputs the
value AH(x).
We say that AH computes a function fH on input x with probability ǫ if Pr
[AH(x) = fH] ≥ ǫ,
where the probability is taken over the internal randomness of A. We say that AH uses t running
time if it outputs AH(x) after round t. In that case, we also say AH uses space ∑ti=1 |σi| and that
AH makes q queries if ∑ti=1 ≤ q.
The Ideal Cipher Model In the ideal cipher model (ICM), there is a publicly available random
block cipher, which has a κ-bit key K and an N bit input and output. Equivalently, all parties,
including any honest parties and adversaries, have access to a family of 2κ independent random
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permutations of [N ]. Moreover for any given key K and x ∈ [N ], both encryption Enc(K,x) and
decryption Dec(K,x) queries can be made to the random block cipher.
Graph Pebbling. The goal of the (black) pebbling game is to place pebbles on all sink nodes
of some input directed acyclic graph (DAG) G = (V,E). The game proceeds in rounds, and each
round i consists of a number of pebbles Pi ⊆ V placed on a subset of the vertices. Initially, the
graph is unpebbled, P0 = ∅, and in each round i ≥ 1, we may place a pebble on v ∈ Pi if either all
parents of v contained pebbles in the previous round (parents(v) ⊆ Pi−1) or if v already contained a
pebble in the previous round (v ∈ Pi−1). In the sequential pebbling game, at most one new pebble
can be placed on the graph in any round (i.e., |Pi\Pi−1| ≤ 1), but this restriction does not apply
in the parallel pebbling game.
We use P‖G to denote the set of all valid parallel pebblings of a fixed graph G. The cumulative
cost of a pebbling P = (P1, . . . , Pt) ∈ P‖G is the quantity cc(P ) := |P1|+ . . .+ |Pt| that represents
the sum of the number of pebbles on the graph during every round. The (parallel) cumulative
pebbling cost of the fixed graph G, denoted cc(G) := min
P∈P‖
G
cc(P ), is the cumulative cost of the
best legal pebbling of G.
Definition 2.2 (Dynamic/Static Pebbling Graph) We define a dynamic pebbling graph as
a distribution G over directed acyclic graphs G = (V = [N ], E) with edges E = {(i − 1, i) : i ≤
N} ∪ {(r(i), i) : i ≤ N}, where r(i) < i − 1 is a randomly chosen directed edge. We say that an
edge (r(i), i) is dynamic if r(i) is not chosen until a black pebbled is place on node i − 1. We say
that the graph is static if none of the edges are dynamic.
We now define a labeling of a graph G.
Definition 2.3 Given a DAG G = (V = [N ], E) and a random oracle function H : Σ∗ → Σw over
an alphabet Σ, we define the labeling of graph G as LG,H : Σ
∗ → Σ∗. In particular, given an input
x the (H,x) labeling of G is defined recursively by
LG,H,x(v) =
{
H(v ◦ x), indeg(v) = 0
H (v ◦ LG,H,x(v1) ◦ · · · ◦ LG,H,x(vd)) , indeg(v) > 0,
where v1, . . . , vd are the parents of v in G, according to some predetermined lexicographical order.
We define fG,H(x) = LG,H,x(s1) ◦ . . . ◦ LG,H,x(sk), where s1, . . . , sk are the sinks of G sorted lexi-
cographically by node index. If there is a single sink node sG then fG,H(x) = LG,H,x(sG). We omit
the subscripts G,H, x when the dependency on the graph G and hash function H is clear. For a
distribution of dynamic graphs G, we say fG,H(x) = fG,H(x) once a dynamic graph G has been
determined from the choice of H and x.
For a node i, we define PotentialParents(i) to be set Yi of minimal size such that Pr [r(i) ∈ Yi] = 1.
We now define k-restricted dynamic graphs, which can characterize both dMHFs and iMHFs.
Definition 2.4 (k-Restricted Dynamic Graph) We say that a dynamic pebbling graph G is
k-restricted if for all i, PotentialParents(i) ≤ k.
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Observe that k = 1 corresponds to an iMHF while k = N corresponds to a dMHF. Hence,
k-restricted dynamic graphs can be viewed as spectrum between dMHFs and iMHFs.
We define the cumulative cost of pebbling a dynamic graph similar to the definition of cumulative
cost of pebblings on static graphs. We first require the following definition of a dynamic pebbling
strategy:
Definition 2.5 (Dynamic Pebbling Strategy) A dynamic pebbling strategy S is a function
that takes as input
(1) an integer i ≤ N
(2) an initial pebbling configuration P i0 ⊆ [i] with i ∈ P i0
(3) a partial graph G≤i+1
The output of S(i, P i0, G≤i+1) is a legal sequence of pebbling moves P
i
1, . . . , P
i
ri that will be used
in the next phase, to place a pebble on node i + 1, so that i + 1 ∈ P iri ⊆ [i + 1]. Given G ∼
G we can abuse notation and write S(G) for the valid pebbling produced by S on the graph G
i.e., P 01 , . . . , P
0
r0 , P
1
1 , . . . , P
1
r1 , . . . , P
N−1
r1 , . . . , P
N−1
rN−1 . Here, P
i
1, . . . , P
i
ri = S(i, P
i
0, G≤i+1) where P
i
0 =
P i−1ri−1 and for i = 1 we set P
0
0 = ∅.
We thus define cc(S,G) to the pebbling cost of strategy S when we sample a dynamic graph
G and cc(S,G) = E
G∼G
[cc(S,G)]. Finally, we define cc(G) = minS cc(S,G), where the minimum
is taken over all dynamic pebbling strategies S. More generally, we define cc(S,G, δ) = max{k :
Pr
G∈G
[cc(S,G) ≥ k] ≥ 1− δ}. Fixing δ to be some negligible function of N , we can define ccδ(G) =
minS cc(S,G, δ).
3 General Attack Against k-Restricted Graphs
In this section, we describe a general attack against k-restricted graphs. We show that the attack
incurs cost o(N2) for k = o
(
N1/ log logN
)
, proving that there is no maximally memory hard k-
restricted graph for small k.
We first require the following formulation of Valiant’s Lemma, which shows the existence of a
subroutine Valiant(G, e, d) to find a depth-reducing set S of size at most e within a graph G, for
e = ηδNlog(N)−η and d =
N
2η , where η > 0.
Lemma 3.1 (Valiant’s Lemma) [Val77] For any DAG G = (V,E) with N nodes, indegree δ,
and η > 0, there exists an efficient algorithm Valiant(G, e, d) to compute a set S of size |S| ≤ e :=
ηδN
log(N)−η such that depth(G− S) ≤ d := N2η .
The high level intuition of the generic attack is as follows. By Valiant’s Lemma (Lemma 3.1),
G ∼ G is (e, d)-reducible for e = ηδNlog(N)−η and d = N2η . We will construct a dynamic pebbling
strategy A that for all times t, maintains a depth-reducing set St such that depth(Gt − St) ≤ d,
where Gt is the portion of G revealed after running A for time t, Gt = G≤i for i = 1+max
⋃t
j=1 Pj ,
where each Pj ⊆ [N ] represents the set of pebbled nodes during round j. Observe that for any
i, G≤i is (e, d)-reducible and hence Gt is also (e, d)-reducible for all times t. Thus, the depth
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reducing set St has size at most e for all times t and can be computed by a subroutine Valiant, by
Lemma 3.1. We now describe how A maintains this depth-reducing set through a series of light
phases and balloon phases.
We first set a parameter g that we will eventually optimize. The goal of each light phase i
is to pebble the next g nodes that have yet to be revealed. That is, if xi is the largest node for
which A has placed a pebble at some point prior to light phase i, then the goal of light phase i
is to pebble the interval [xi + 1, xi + g]. To begin light phase i at some time ti, we require that
(PotentialParents([xi + 1, xi + g]) ∪ Sti) ⊆ Pti for some depth-reducing set Sti of size at most e,
such that depth(Gti − Sti) ≤ d. Once this pre-condition is met, then light phase i simply takes g
steps to pebble [xi+1, xi+ g], since pebbles are already placed on PotentialParents([xi+1, xi+ g]).
Hence, the post-condition of light phase i at some time ui is pebbles on the node xi + g and some
depth-reducing set Sui of size at most e, such that depth(Gui − Sui) ≤ d.
The goal of each balloon phase i is to place pebbles on all revealed nodes of the graph, to meet
the pre-condition of light phase i + 1. To begin balloon phase i at some time ri, we first have a
necessary pre-condition that pebbles are placed on some depth-reducing set Sri of size at most e
such that depth(Gri − Sri) ≤ d. Once this pre-condition is met, then balloon phase i simply takes
d steps to pebble the entire graph Gri , meeting the post-condition of balloon phase i.
We now formally prove the cumulative memory complexity of the attack in Algorithm 1.
Theorem 3.2 Let G be any family of k-restricted dynamic graphs with constant indeg(G). Then
cc(G) = O
(
N2
log logN
+N2−1/2 log logN
√
k1−1/ log logN
)
.
Proof : We analyze the cost of the pebbling strategy of Algorithm 1. Since G is drawn from a
distribution of k-restricted dynamic graphs, then for any node xi, r(xi) must be one of at most k
labels. Thus for any consecutive g nodes, |PotentialParents([xi + 1, xi + g])| ≤ gk. Hence it suffices
to keep gk pebbles on the set of potential parents PotentialParents([xi + 1, xi + g]) to pebble the
interval [xi + 1, xi + g], as well as a depth-reducing set of size at most e, for each of the g steps
during light phase i. On the other hand, balloon phase i takes d steps, each of which trivially
contains at most N pebbles.
A proceeds using Ng total rounds of light and balloon phases, by pebbling g consecutive nodes
at a time. Therefore, the total cost of the attack is O
(
Ngk +Ne+ Ng · dN
)
, where the first
and second terms originate from the cost of the light phases and the third term results from
the cost of the balloon phases. Since we set e = ηδNlog(N)−η and d =
N
2η from Valiant’s Lemma
(Lemma 3.1) so that the total cost is O
(
ηδN2
log(N)−η +Ngk +
N3
2ηg
)
. By setting g = N√
k2η
, the
total cost is O
(
N2ηδ
logN−η +N
2
√
k
2η
)
. Finally, by setting η = log k+logN−log δlog logN , the total cost is
O
(
N2
log logN +N
2−1/2 log logN√k1−1/ log logN
)
. ✷
Note that if k = o(N1/ log logN ), then cc(G) = o(N2).
Corollary 3.3 Let G be any k-restricted dynamic graph with k = o(N1/ log logN ) and constant
indegree. Then cc(G) = o(N2).
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Algorithm 1 Generic pebbling strategy against dynamic DAG G.
Input: An integer i, an initial pebbling configuration P i0 ⊆ [i] with i ∈ P i0, a partial graph G≤i+1,
and parameters d, e, g.
Output: A legal pebbling of G≤i+1.
1: invariant← True
2: if i (mod g) ≡ 0 and depth(G≤i+1 − P i0) > d then
3: invariant← False
4: else if depth(G≤i+1 − P i0) > d or {i} ∪ PotentialParents([i + 1, i + g]) 6⊆ P i0 then
5: invariant← False
6: if invariant then ⊲If pre-conditions met.
7: if i (mod g) ≡ 0 then ⊲Balloon phase
8: for j = 1 to j = d do
9: P ij = P
i
j−1 ∪Dj , where Dj are the nodes at depth d from P i0.
10: P id+1 = Valiant(G≤i, e, d) ∪ PotentialParents([i+ 1, i+ g]). ⊲See Lemma 3.1
11: else ⊲Light phase
12: P i1 = P
i
0 ∪ {i+ 1}.
13: else ⊲If pre-conditions not met.
14: for j = 1 to j = i+ 1 do
15: P ij = P
i
j−1 ∪ {j}.
4 k-Restricted Graphs with high CMC
In this section, we describe a construction of k-restricted graphs with high cumulatively memory
complexity that builds into our ultimate ciMHF implementation. We first describe the block
partition extension gadget, which requires an input graph G and outputs a family of k-restricted
dynamic graphs. However, na¨ıvely choosing the input graph G does not yield a construction with
high CMC.
Intuitively, the block partition extension gadget takes the last N nodes of G and partitions
them into Nk blocks of k nodes each. The gadget then creates N more nodes in a path, such that
a parent r(j) of node j in this path is drawn uniformly at random from block i, where i = j
(mod Nk ). The intuition is that by drawing parents uniformly at random from each block in round
robin fashion, we encourage an algorithm to keep Ω(N) nodes on the graph for Ω(N) steps. Of
course, the graph could always maintain o(n) pebbles on the graph and repebble when necessary,
but we can discourage this strategy by making the repebbling procedure as expensive as possible.
A first attempt would be to choose a highly depth-robust graph G, such as a grates graph,
which informally has long paths of length Ω(N1−ǫ) for any constant 0 < ǫ < 1, even when Ω(N)
nodes are removed from G. Thus if an algorithm does not maintain Ω(N) pebbles on the graph,
the repebbling strategy costs at least Ω(N2−ǫ). Although this is a good start, this does not quite
match the Ω(N2) CMC of various dMHFs. We defer full discussion of how to increase the CMC to
Ω(N2) to later in this section.
Instead, we first define a specific way to obtain a k-restricted dynamic graph given a graph G
with N nodes and a parameter k.
Definition 4.1 (Block Partition Extension) Given a DAG G = (V = [αN ], E) with αN nodes
containing a set of O = [(α − 1)N + 1, αN ] output nodes of size N and a parameter k, let Oi =
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[(α − 1)N + 1 + ik, (α − 1)N + (i + 1)k] for i ∈ [Nk ] so that {Oi} forms a partition of O. We
define the block partition extension of G, denoted BlockPartitionk(G), as a distribution of graphs
GG,k. Each graph G
′ sampled from G has vertices V ′ = [(α+1)N ] and edges E′ = E ∪F , where F
is defined as the edges (i − 1, i) and (r(i), i) for each i ∈ [αN + 1, (α + 1)N ], where r(i) is drawn
uniformly at random from Oi mod N
k
.
An example of the block partition extension is given in Figure 1.
1 2 . . . k . . . . . . . . .
Block 1 Block 2 . . . Block Nk
. . .
Fig. 1: Parent r(i) is drawn uniformly at random from the nodes partitioned to each block.
Our ultimate construction also requires the use of superconcentrator graphs, defined as follows:
Definition 4.2 A graph G with O (N) vertices is a superconcentrator if there exists an input set
I and an output set O with |I| = |O| = N such that for all S1 ⊆ I, S2 ⊆ O with |S1| = |S2| = k,
there are k node disjoint paths from S1 to S2.
It is known that there exists superconcentrators with |I| = |O| = N , constant indegree and O (N)
total nodes [Pip77, LT82]. We now show that a set Y , which contains more nodes than a set S of
removed nodes, has at least N − |S| ancestors in G− S.
Lemma 4.3 Given a superconcentrator G with N input nodes I and N output nodes O, let S and
Y ⊆ O be sets of nodes with |S| < |Y |. Then |I ∩ ancestorsG−S(Y )| ≥ N − |S|.
Proof : Let X ⊆ I be the last |Y | nodes of I. Since G is a superconcentrator, then G contains
at least |Y | node disjoint paths between X and Y . Since |S| < |Y |, then one of these paths
from X to Y that does not intersect S. Thus, X contains some ancestor of Y in G − S and
in fact by considering the paths associated with decreasing order of nodes in X, it follows that
|I ∩ ancestorsG−S(Y )| ≥ N − |S|. ✷
We require the use of grates graphs {gratesN,ǫ}∞N=1 [Sch83]. For each constant ǫ > 0 and each N ≥ 1
the graph gratesN,ǫ = (VN , EN,ǫ) has O (N) nodes and constant indegree indeg(gratesN,ǫ) = O (1).
Moreover, the graph gratesN,ǫ contains source nodes IN ⊂ VN and N sinks ON ⊂ VN . Given a
set S ⊆ VN of deleted nodes we say that an output node y ∈ ON is c-good with respect to S if∣∣∣IN ∩ ancestorsgratesN,ǫ−S(y)∣∣∣ ≥ cN i.e., for at least cN input nodes x ∈ IN the graph gratesN,ǫ − S
still contains a path from x to y. The grates graph contains several properties summarized below.
Theorem 4.4 [Sch83] For each ǫ > 0 there exist constants γ, c > 0 such that for all N ≥ 1 the
graph gratesN,ǫ is (γN, cN
1−ǫ)-depth robust. Furthermore, for each set S ⊆ VN of size |S| ≤ γN at
least cN output nodes are still c-good with respect to S. Formally,
|{x ∈ O : |IN ∩ ancestorsG−S(x)| ≥ cN}| ≥ cN .
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G2
G
G1
Fig. 2: An example of a graph overlay overlay(G1, G,G2).
We require the use of graph overlays, defined as follows:
Definition 4.5 (Graph overlays) Given a DAG H = (V = [N ], E) with sources I = {1, . . . , n1}
and sinks O = {N−n2+1, . . . , N}, a DAG G1 = (V1 = [n1], E1), and a DAG G2 = (V2 = [n2], E2),
we define:
(1) the graph overlay G′ = overlay(G1,H,G2) by G′ = ([N ], E′), where (i, j) ∈ E′ if and only if
(i, j) ∈ E or (i, j) ∈ E1 or (i+N − n2, j +N − n2) ∈ E2
(2) the superconcentrator overlay of an N node DAG G by superconc(G) = overlay(G,SCN , LN ),
where SCN is a superconcentrator with N input (sources) and output (sinks) nodes and LN
is the line graph of N nodes
(3) the grates overlay of an N node DAG G by gratesǫ(G) = overlay(G, gratesN,ǫ, LN ).
An example of a graph overlay is displayed in Figure 2.
We describe a preliminary attempt at a ciMHF construction in Figure 3. At a high level, the
construction consists of four components. The first component is a grates graph G1 with N nodes.
The second component is a superconcentrator overlay with O (N) nodes, including N input nodes
and N output nodes, so that G2 = superconc(G1). The third component consists of a grates overlay
with O (N) nodes including N output nodes, so that G3 = gratesǫ(G2). The N output nodes of G3
are partitioned into Nk blocks, each with k nodes, in preparation for a block partition extension in
the final component. Namely, the fourth component consists of a k-restricted graph with N nodes,
so that G4 = BlockPartitionk(G3).
The intuition for the Ω(N2) cumulative pebbling complexity is as follows. Suppose there exists
a time tbad with a “small” number of pebbles on the graph. Then with high probability, walking a
pebble s = N4k steps on the final layer of the graph will require some number of output nodes of the
grates graph to be repebbled. Again with high probability, repebbling one of these output nodes
requires a large number of input nodes of the grates graph to be repebbled. These input nodes are
the output nodes of the superconcentrator at the second layer. The superconcentrator property
then implies that Ω(N) nodes of the grates graph on the first layer will need to be repebbled. For
a grates graph that is (Ω(N),Ω(N1−ǫ))-depth robust, this cost is at least Ω(N2−ǫ) every s steps.
Thus, the total cost is at least min
(
Ω(N2), kΩ(N2−ǫ)
)
, which is just Ω(N2) for k = Ω(N ǫ).
We now show that our construction in Figure 3 has cumulative memory complexity Ω(N2).
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Sampling Algorithm, for k = Ω(N ǫ):
(1) G1 = gratesN,ǫ
(2) G2 = superconc(G1)
(3) G3 = gratesǫ(G2)
(4) G4 ∼ BlockPartitionk(G3)
Fig. 3: First attempt at ciMHF. Each parent r(i) is randomly chosen from the labels in specific
block corresponding to i.
Theorem 4.6 Let G be drawn from the distribution of k-restricted graphs in Figure 3, for k =
Ω(N ǫ). There exist constants c1 > 0 and c2 ∈ (0, 1) such that for any dynamic pebbling strategy S,
Pr
G
[
cc(S,G) > c1N
2
] ≥ 1− cN/k2 .
Proof : Let αN be the total number of nodes in G3 so that the total number of nodes in G
is (α + 1)N . Let x, y ∈ (0, 1) be constants such that the grates graph G1 is (xN, yN1−ǫ)-depth
robust. By Theorem 4.4, there exist constants 0 < c < x2 and 0 < γ < c such that for any set S
with |S| ≤ γN , at least cN nodes in the output nodes of G3 are c-good with respect to S. For
each node i, let ti be the first time that node i is pebbled. Suppose there exists a time tbad with
ti ≤ tbad < ti+1 such that there are |Ptbad | < γN4 pebbles on the graph.
For a node j in the output set [(α−1)N,αN ] of G3, we call an index j a costly index if j is c-good
with respect to Ptbad and let COSTLY be the set of costly indices. Note that if a node i ∈ COSTLY,
then by definition i /∈ Ptbad . By Theorem 4.4 and the observation that |Ptbad | < γN4 , there are at
least cN nodes in the output set of G3 are c-good with respect to Ptbad , i.e., |COSTLY| > cN . Then
for s := Nk , we call j ∈ [i, i + s] a missed costly index if r(j) /∈ Ptbad and let r(j) ∈ COSTLY.
For each j ∈ [Nk ], let cj be the number of costly indices in block j of the output set of G3,
i.e., cj := |COSTLY ∩ [(α − 1)N + (j − 1)k + 1, (α − 1)N + jk]|. Since the parents of [i, i + s] are
exactly one random node from each of the Nk blocks, then the probability p that no parent of [i, i+s]
is a missed costly index is
p :=
N/k∏
j=1
(
1− cj
k
)
≤

 k
N
N/k∑
j=1
(
1− cj
k
)
N/k
,
where the inequality holds by the Arithmetic Mean-Geometric Mean Inequality. Since
∑
cj = cN ,
then
p ≤

1− k
N
N/k∑
j=1
cj
k


N/k
≤ (1− c)N/k.
Thus with high probability, there will be some missed costly index.
By Lemma 4.3 and the definition of c-good, any missed costly index requires cN nodes in the
input set of G3 to be repebbled. Since the input set of G3 is connected by a superconcentrator to
13
the output set of G1, the cN nodes in the input set of G3 that need to be repebbled have at least
N − cN ancestors in the output set of G1. Thus, at least N − cN − |Ptbad | nodes in G1 must be
repebbled.
Because G1 is (xN, yN
1−ǫ)-depth robust, then G1−S is (xN−|S|, yN1−ǫ)-depth robust for any
set S. Moreover, the cost to pebble G1 − S is at least (xN − |S|)(yN1−ǫ). In particular, if G1 − S
is the set of nodes in G1 must be repebbled, then it costs at least (xN − cN − |Ptbad |)(yN1−ǫ) to
repebble G1 − S. Since c < x2 and |Ptbad | < γN4 < cN4 < xN8 , then the cost is at least 3xy8 N2−ǫ.
Hence to pebble an interval [i, i + s] with s = Nk , either
γN
4 pebbles are kept on the graph for
all s = Nk steps or if we at any point in time j ∈ [i, i + s] we have |Pj | ≤ γN/4 then (whp) an the
pebbling algorithm incurs cost 3xy8 N
2−ǫ to repebble the graph during the next s steps [j, j+ s]. By
partitioning the last N nodes of the graph G into k disjoint intervals of length Nk , it follows that
the total cost is at least min
(
γN2
4 ,
3
16xykN
2−ǫ
)
. Thus for k = Ω(N ǫ), the total cost is Ω(N2) with
high probability. ✷
Corollary 4.7 Let G be drawn from the distribution of k-restricted graphs in Figure 3, for k =
Ω(N ǫ). Then cc(G) = Ω(N2).
5 k-Restricted Graphs: Amenable to Shuffling
In this section, we introduce a useful property for certain dynamic graphs: amenable to shuffling. In
Section 6, we will describe computationally data-independent evaluation algorithms for evaluating
memory hard function based on dynamic graphs that are amenable to shuffling.
5.1 Characterization of Dynamic Graphs Amenable to Shuffling
We first describe the properties of dynamic graphs that are amenable to shuffling. Recall that for a
node i, we define PotentialParents(i) to be set Yi of minimal size such that Pr [r(i) ∈ Yi] = 1, where
r(i) < i− 1 is randomly chosen so that the directed edge (r(i), i) is in the dynamic graph.
Definition 5.1 (Amenable to Shuffling) Let G be a DAG with αN nodes for some constant
α > 1 and let L be the last N nodes of G. Suppose that L can be partitioned into Nk groups
G1, . . . , GN
k
such that
(1) Uniform Size of Groups: |Gi| = k for all i ∈
[
N
k
]
.
(2) Large Number of Potential Parents: For each v ∈ L, |PotentialParents(u)| = k.
(3) Potential Parents not in L: For each v ∈ L, PotentialParents(u) ⊆ [(α− 1)N ]
(4) Same Potential Parents for Each Group: For all i ∈ [Nk ] and u, v ∈ Gi, PotentialParents(u) =
PotentialParents(v).
(5) Different Potential Parents for Different Groups: For all i, j ∈ [Nk ] with i 6= j, let u ∈ Gi
and v ∈ Gj . Then PotentialParents(u) ∩ PotentialParents(v) = ∅.
(6) No Collision for Parents: For each i ∈ [Nk ], define the event UNIQUEi to be the event that
r(u) 6= r(v) for all u, v ∈ Gi. Then Pr [UNIQUEi] = 1 for all i ∈
[
N
k
]
.
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(7) Data-Independency: The subgraph induced by the first (α− 1)N nodes is a static graph.
Then we call G amenable to shuffling.
We shall show in Theorem 6.2 in Section 6 that dynamic graphs that are amenable to shuffling can
be used for memory hard functions with computationally data-independent evaluation algorithms.
We now describe a version of Figure 3 that is amenable to shuffling.
5.2 Version of Construction Amenable to Shuffling
To ensure that there does not exist i 6= j such that r(i) = r(j), we slightly modify the construction
of block partition extensions to the concept of a collision-resistant block partition extension. For
the sake of presentation, note that we use 2N output nodes in G in the following definition.
Definition 5.2 (Collision-Resistant Block Partition Extension) Given a DAG G = (V =
[αN ], E) with αN nodes containing a set of O = [(α − 2)N + 1, αN ] output nodes of size 2N and
a parameter k, let Oi = [(α − 2)N + 1 + 2ik, (α − 2)N + 2(i + 1)k] for i ∈
[
N
k
]
so that {Oi}
forms a partition of O. We define the collision-resistant block partition extension of G, denoted
CR− BlockPartitionk(G), as a distribution of graphs GG,k. Each graph G′ sampled from G has
vertices V ′ = [(α + 1)N ] and edges E′ = E ∪ F , where F is defined as the edges (i − 1, i) and
(r(i), i) for each i ∈ [αN + 1, (α + 1)N ], where r(i) is defined as follows:
(1) Let Enc be the family of all permutations of [2k], so that for each fixed j,
{Enc(j, ℓ)}ℓ∈[2k] = [2k] .
(2) For each i ∈ [αN+1, (α+1)N ], let j = i mod Nk and define 1 ≤ p ≤ k to be the unique integer
such that i = Nk (p− 1) + αNi+ j. Then we define r(i) = (α− 2)N + 1+ 2jk + Enc(x ◦ j, p),
so that r(i) ∈ Oj .
Observe that the collision-resistant block partition extension is a gadget that yields a dMHF, since
the parent function r(i) has the key x ◦ j to its permutation function Enc. Hence, the underlying
dynamic graph differs across different input values x.
Then our construction of the ciMHF appears in Figure 4 and Figure 5. As before, the construc-
tion consists of four layers. The first layer consists of a grates graph with 2N nodes, G1 = grates2N,ǫ.
The second layer consists of a superconcentrator overlay with O (N) nodes with 2N input nodes
and 2N output nodes, so that G2 = superconc(G1). The third layer consists of a grates overlay with
O (N) nodes including 2N output nodes, so that G3 = gratesǫ(G2). The 2N output nodes of G3
are partitioned into Nk blocks, each with 2k nodes, which allows the final layer to be a 2k-restricted
grpah. In particular, the fourth layer uses a collision-free block partition extension rather than the
block partition extension of Figure 3.
We now show that the construction of Figure 4 has cumulative cost Ω(N2) with high probability.
The proof is almost verbatim to Theorem 4.6 except that the graph overlays now have 2N input
and output nodes.
Theorem 5.3 Let 0 < ǫ < 1 be a constant and k = Ω(N ǫ). Let G be drawn from the distribution
of 2k-restricted graphs in Figure 4. There exist constants c1 > 0 and c2 ∈ (0, 1) such that for any
dynamic pebbling strategy S,
Pr
G∈G
[
cc(S,G) > c1N
2
] ≥ 1− cN/k2 .
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Sampling algorithm, for k = Ω(N ǫ):
(1) G1 = grates2N,ǫ
(2) G2 = superconc(G1)
(3) G3 = gratesǫ(G2)
(4) G4 ∼ CR− BlockPartitionk(G3)
Fig. 4: Second attempt at ciMHF. Each parent r(i) is chosen by a permtuation of the labels in
specific block corresponding to i. The underlying graph is visualized in Figure 5.
CR− BlockPartition
. . .
. . .
gratesǫ
. . .
superconc
. . .
grates
. . .
Fig. 5: Final construction of Figure 4.
Corollary 5.4 Let G be drawn from the distribution of 2k-restricted graphs in Figure 4, for k =
Ω(N ǫ). Then cc(G) = Ω(N2).
Finally, we observe that the construction of Figure 4 is amenable to shuffling since it satisfies the
properties of Definition 5.1.
6 Implementation of ciMHF
In this section, we describe how to implement our construction in a way that is computationally
data-independent. We first formalize the notion of computationally data-independent and then
describe the system model we utilize.
6.1 Computationally Data-Independent MHF (ciMHF) and Systems Model
We define the security of a computationally data-independent memory hard function in terms of
the following game: a side-channel attacker A selects two inputs x0, x1 and sends these inputs to
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an honest party H. We first require the following definition of leakage patterns.
Leakage Pattern. We define the leakage pattern of an evaluation algorithm MHF.Eval by the
sequence of request and store instructions made in each round. Specifically, in each round r, an
attacker can observe from the leakage pattern the blocks of memory to be loaded into cache, as
requested by MHF.Eval. Let i = (i1, . . . , im) be the sequence of locations of all blocks requested by
MHF.Eval in a particular round r through some command load(i). If i is completely contained in
cache, then no events will be observed by the attacker. Otherwise, if i is not completely contained
in cache, we use requestr to denote the locations of the blocks in memory, as well as their sizes,
requested by MHF.Eval in round r. Similarly, we use storer to denote the locations of the blocks,
as well as their sizes, stored into memory by MHF.Eval in round r. We do not allow the attacker
to observe the contents of the requested or stored blocks. Formally, the leakage pattern LP is the
information {(requestr, storer)}tr=1 and is dependent on the algorithm MHF.Eval, random oracle H,
internal randomness R, and input value x.
Computationally Data-Independency Game. H runs a (randomized) evaluation algorithm
MHF.Eval on both inputs x0 and x1, yielding two leakage patterns LP0 and LP1, where LPi for
i ∈ {0, 1} depends on both the input xi and the random coins selected during the execution of
MHF.Eval. H then picks a random challenge bit b ∈ {0, 1} and sends LPb, LP1−b to A to simulate
a side-channel. The goal of A is to predict b i.e., match each input with the corresponding leakage
pattern. For a secure ciMHF we guarantee that any PPT side-channel attacker A wins the game
with only negligible advantage over random guessing.
Formally, the game consists of three phases setup, challenge, and guess, which are described
as follows.
Data independency game for ciMHF:
setup In this phase, A selects the security parameter λ and two challenge messages x0 and
x1 and sends them to H. Here we assume without loss of generality that the runtime of
the evaluation algorithm MHF.Eval on x0 and x1 are the same.
challenge In this phase, H selects a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} and random coins R0, R1 ∈
{0, 1}λ uniformly at random and then samples lp0 ← LP(MHF.Eval(x0;R0)) and lp1 ←
LP(MHF.Eval(x1;R1)). H sends the ordered pair (lpb, lp1−b) to A.
guess After receiving (lpb, lp1−b), the adversary A outputs b′ as a guess for b. The adversary
wins the game if b = b′.
The advantage of the adversary to win the game of computationally data independency of the
given MHF is defined as
Advind−lp−iMHFA,MHF =
∣∣∣∣12 − Pr[A(x0, x1, lpb, lp1−b) = b′ : b = b′)]
∣∣∣∣ ,
where lpi = LP(xi;MHF.Eval(xi;Ri)).
Definition 6.1 (Computational data independency) An evaluation algorithm MHF.Eval is
computationally data independent if for all non-uniform circuits A = {Aλ}λ∈N, there is a neg-
ligible function negl(·) such that Advind−lp−iMHFA,MHF < negl(λ).
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With the proper random coins, a memory-hard function with an evaluation algorithm that satisfies
the above definition reveals only a negligible amount of information through its leakage patterns,
and we thus call such a function a computationally data-independent memory hard function.
On the Definition of Computational Data Independency. In section Section 6.2.2 we show
that the definition is equivalent to a multi round version of the game in which the attacker can
adaptively select the challenge xi,0, xi,1 in each round i ≤ r after observing lpi−1,b, lpi−1,1−b —
the memory access patterns from the last round. We also prove that the two security notions
are asymptotically equivalent when the attacker runs in polynomial time — in terms of concrete
security parameters we lose a factor of r (number of challenge rounds) in the reduction.
We are primarily motivated by the password hashing application where the inputs x0 and x1
come from a small domain, as user selected passwords tend to have low entropy [Bon12]. In practice
it is reasonable to assume that r is polynomial i.e., if the user only authenticates poly(λ) times
then there are at most r = poly(λ) memory access patterns for the attacker to observe. Assuming
that the input domain has size poly(λ) a brute-force attacker cannot use the leaked memory access
pattern on input x to eliminate any candidate password x′ with high probability, otherwise the
attacker could have used the pair x and x′ to win the data independency game.
However, in settings where the input domain is very large and r is super-polynomial it will
be better to adopt a concrete security definition (see Section 6.2.2). The asymptotic definition in
Definition 6.1 does not definitively rule out the possibility that an attacker can substantially narrow
the search space after many (super-polynomial) side channel attacks. For example, suppose that
the attacker gets to observe lpi ← LP(MHF.Eval(x;Ri)) for i = 1, . . . , 2λ, i.e., 2λ independent evalu-
ations of MHF on secret input x. Supposing that Advind−lp−iMHFA,MHF = 2
−λ and that the input domain
for MHF has size 22λ, it is possible that each lpi allows the attacker to eliminate a random subset
of Advind−lp−iMHFA,MHF × 22λ = 2λ candidate inputs, allowing the attacker to find x after just O
(
λ2λ
)
examples. However, in practice it will usually be reasonable to assume that the attacker gets to
observe lpi a polynomial number of times i.e., the honest party will execute LP(MHF.Eval(x;Ri))
at most poly(λ) times.
Memory Architecture Assumptions. We consider a tiered random access memory architec-
ture with main memory (RAM) and working memory (cache). We assume that main memory
(RAM) is a shared resource with other untrusted processes, each of which have their own cache.
Although the operating system kernel will enforce memory separation, i.e., only our program has
some region of memory and that other processes cannot read/write to this block, it is also possible
that an untrusted process will be able to infer the memory address of read/write operations in
RAM (due to side-channel effects).
Formally, the system allows programs access to two operations Write(i, x), which takes an
address i within the memory allocated to the program and writes the value x at address i, and
Read(i) which loads the data at location i. When an operation requests memory at location i,
there are two possible outcomes. Either the data item is already in cache or the data item is not
in cache. In the second case, the location of the item in memory is revealed through the leakage
pattern. Hence, the leakage pattern is either ⊥, if the data item is already in cache, or i, if the
data item is not in cache.
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Cache Replacement Policy. We now show that our implementation of the dynamic pebbling
construction with cumulative memory cost Ω(N2) is computationally data-independent. In particu-
lar, we provide an evaluation algorithm whose leakage pattern is computationally indistinguishable
under each of the following cache replacement policies:
Least recently used (LRU) This policy tracks the most recent time each item in cache was
used and discards the least recently used items first when cache is full and items need to be
replaced.
First in first out (FIFO) This policy evicts the first item that was loaded into cache, ignoring
how recent or how often it has been accessed.
6.2 ciMHF Implementation
Recall from the definition of a graph labeling in Definition 2.3 that given a function H and a
distribution of dynamic graphs G, the goal is to compute fG,H(x) for some input x, which is
equivalent to fG,H(x) once the graph G has been determined by the choice of H and x. In this
section, we describe a computationally data-independent implementation of the construction of
Section 5.2.
We implement the first three layers as data-independent components. Namely, the grates graph
G1, its superconcentrator overlay G2 and the subsequent grates overlay G3 can be implemented
deterministically. Observe that G3 has αN nodes, including 2N output nodes O that are partitioned
into Nk blocks of size 2k each. Specifically O = O1∪ . . .∪ON
k
, where Oj = [(α−2)N +1+2jk, (α−
2)N + 2(j + 1)k] for j ∈ [Nk ].
As stated in Figure 4, the collision-resistant block partition extension G4 is actually data-
independent, since for each i ∈ [(α− 1)N,αN ], each parent r(i) of i is chosen uniformly at random
from k possible nodes, but the random procedure is independent of the input x. Hence, the challenge
is to implement a computationally data-independent version of the collision-resistant block partition
extension. We demand the input of a key K for each computation of fG,H(x). The value of fG,H(x)
remains the same across all keys K but the leakage pattern is different for each K.
Data-Dependent Dynamic Graph. For each i ∈ [αN + 1, (α + 1)N ], let j = i mod Nk . To
implement a computationally data-independent version of G4 from Figure 4, we use the value of
LG,H,x(i − 1) to select a previously “unused” node of Oj as the parent r(i) for i that is not i− 1.
Here, we say a node v ∈ Oj is unused if it is not the parent of any node besides v + 1 and i.
Since LG,H,x(i − 1) can be viewed as a random integer modulo 2k, we can use LG,H,x(i − 1)
(mod 2k) as an input to a permutation with key K to randomly choose the parent of i from Oj .
Observe that i = αN + j is the first time a parent will be selected from Oj . Moreover, observe
that m = LG,H,x(i − 1) (mod 2k) + 1 can be viewed as a random number from [2k] so we set
r(i) = m+ (α− 2)N + 1 + 2jk as the mth entry of Oj .
Now if LG,H,x(i−1) (mod 2k) were all unique across the values of {i|i mod Nk ≡ j}, then there
would be no collisions among selections of parents in Oj and we would be done. However, since
these values are not unique, we must do a little more work to avoid collisions, which would reveal
information through leakage patterns about the parents of two nodes being the same. To ensure
there are no collisions in Oj among parents, we store an array Uj of size 2k for each block Oj . For
each 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ 2k, we initialize Uj [ℓ] = ℓ. The purpose of the Uj array is to ensure that the nodes
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1 2 . . . 2k . . . . . . . . .
Block 1 Block 2 . . . Block Nk
Enc(1 ◦K, ·) Enc(2 ◦K, ·) Enc (Nk ◦K, ·)
. . . . . . . . . . . .
. . .
Fig. 6: Parent r(i) is drawn uniformly at random from the nodes partitioned to each block.
of Oj that have already appeared as parents are at the end of Uj . In the above example when
r(i) = m+(α− 2)N +1+2jk, we then set Uj[m] = 2k and Uj[2k] = m. Then in the next round of
selecting a parent from Oj , we choose uniformly at random from the first 2k − 1 entries of Uj and
in general, for the sth round of selecting a parent from Oj , we choose uniformly at random from
the first 2k − s+ 1 entries of Uj .
Specifically for some 2 ≤ s ≤ k, consider the sth iteration in which a parent is selected from Oj .
That is, for i = αN+j+(s−1)Nk , the parent r(i) is the sth parent among the nodes of Oj . Observe
that m = LG,H,x(i − 1) (mod 2k − s + 1) can be viewed as a random number from [2k − s + 1]
and so Uj [m] is a random entry among the unselected 2k − s + 1 nodes of Oj. We then swap the
values of Uj[m] and Uj[2k − s+ 1] so that if Uj [m] = a and Uj [2k − s + 1] = b previously then we
set Uj [m] = b and Uj [2k − s + 1] = a. Hence, the invariant remains that the first 2k − s locations
of Uj have been unused.
Shuffling Leakage Patterns. Finally, we point out that the leakage pattern across all compu-
tations of fG,H(x) is still the same, since we have not actually incorporated the key K in any of the
above details. In summary, the above the description ensures a collision-resistant block partition
extension that is data-dependent, but is still vulnerable to side-channel attacks. Hence, we add a
final element to our implementation that shuffles the locations of each node p ∈ Oj inside Oj . That
is, for each 1 ≤ j ≤ Nk , we use the keyed permutation Enc to store the label of p ∈ Oj in the location
that corresponds to Enc(j ◦ K, p) instead. Thus if r(i) = p ∈ Oj for some node i, the algorithm
must look at the location associated with Enc(j ◦K, p) to learn the value of LG,H,x(p). Therefore,
the underlying graph G is a dynamic graph that is data-dependent but the leakage pattern across
each computation of fG,H(x) is different due to the choice of K that shuffles the locations of all
labels in each block Oj . A high level example of this shuffling is shown in Figure 6.
Observe that this shuffling must be done completely in the cache to avoid leaking locations of
labels during the shuffling. Hence, we require cache eviction policies such as the least recently used
(LRU) or first in first out (FIFO) cache eviction policies to ensure that the entire block Oj will
remain in cache as the shuffling is performed. We describe the implementation in full in Figure 7.
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Computationally data-independent sequential evaluation algorithmMHF.Eval(x;R) to compute
fG,H(x) for any k-restricted dynamic graph G that is amenable to shuffling.
(1) Data-independent phase:
(a) Let G be a k-restricted dynamic graph with αN nodes for some constant α > 1 that
is amenable to shuffling, L be the last N nodes of G, and H be an arbitrary hash
function.
(b) Let K = Setup(1λ;R) be a hidden random permutation key for each computation
of fG,H(x), given the security parameter λ and random bits R.
(c) Recall that the subgraph induced by the first (α − 1)N nodes is a static graph.
Compute the label LG,H,x(v) for each node v ∈ (G− L).
(2) Shuffling phase:
(a) Since G is amenable to shuffling, L can be partitioned into groups G1, . . . , GN
k
that satisfy the definition of Definition 5.1. For each j ∈ [Nk ], let Oj =
PotentialParents(Gj).
(b) For each j ∈ [Nk ], shuffle the contents of Oj :
i. Let v1, . . . , vk be the vertices in Oj .
ii. Load the labels LG,H,x(v1), . . . , LG,H,x(vk) into cache.
iii. Shuffle the positions of LG,H,x(v1), . . . , LG,H,x(vk) so that for each p ∈ [k],
LG,H,x(vp) is in the location that previously corresponded to LG,H,x(vq), where
q = Enc(j ◦K, p), where Enc is a keyed pseudorandom permutation of k.
(3) Data-dependent phase:
(a) For each j ∈ [Nk ], initialize an array Uj such that for all 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ k, Uj[ℓ] = ℓ.
(b) For each i = αN + 1 to (α+ 1)N :
i. Let j and s be defined so that 1 ≤ s ≤ k and 1 ≤ j ≤ Nk given i = αN + j +
(s− 1)Nk and let m = LG,H,x(i− 1) (mod k − s+ 1) + 1.
ii. Set r(i) = Uj[m] + (α − 1)N + 1 + jk so that r(i) ∈ Oj and load LG,H,x(r(i)).
(Recall that the label of r(i) is actually located at the position where the label
of node Enc(j ◦K,U [m]) was previously located prior to the shuffling.)
iii. Load LG,H,x(r(i)) and LG,H,x(i−1) and compute LG,H,x(i) = H(i◦LG,H,x(r(i))◦
LG,H,x(i− 1)).
iv. Let Uj[Uj [m]] = a and Uj[k − s+ 1] = b. Then swap the values of Uj at Uj [m]
and k − s+ 1 so that Uj [Uj [m]] = b and Uj[k − s+ 1] = a.
Fig. 7: Description of evaluation algorithm for k-restricted graphs that are amenable to shuffling.
Note that each computation of fG,H(x) requires as input random bits R to generate the leakage
patterns.
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A Note on Oblivious RAM. The complications with the cache eviction policies and shuffling
leakage patterns originate from the necessity of not divulging information in the data-independency
game. One reasonable question is whether these complications can be avoided with other imple-
mentations that conceal the leakage patterns. For example, an algorithm using oblivious RAM
(ORAM), introduced by Goldreich and Ostrovsky [GO96], reveals no information through the
memory access patterns about the underlying operations performed. Thus, an algorithm using an
ORAM data structure to evaluate a memory hard function would induce a computationally inde-
pendent memory hard function, regardless of whether the underlying function is data-dependent or
data-independent. [GO96] describe an oblivious RAM simulator that transforms any program in
the standard RAM model into a program in the oblivious RAM model, where the leakage pattern
is information theoretically hidden, which is ideal for the data-independency game.
Existing constructions of ORAM protocols such as Path ORAM [SvDS+18] require amortized
Ω(logN) bandwidth overhead. Hence given any dMHF and evaluation algorithm running in se-
quential time M , we can use ORAM to develop a new evaluation algorithm with a concealed
leakage pattern, running in sequential time N = M logM . However, this is not ideal because the
cumulative memory complexity of the dMHF is O (M2) = O ( N2
log2 N
)
. Viewed in this way, the
ciMHF construction is worse than known iMHF constructions that achieve CMC Ω
(
N2
logN
)
such as
DRSample [ABH17, BHK+19]. In fact, even for k-restricted graphs, we still obtain a blow-up of
Ω(log2K), which is Ω
(
log2 N
log2 logN
)
when k = Ω(N1/ log logN ). Otherwise for k = o(N1/ log logN ), our
dynamic pebbling attack in Corollary 3.3 shows that the CMC is at most o(N2).
Although Boyle and Naor [BN16] proposed the notion of online ORAM, where the operations to
be performed arrive in an online manner, and observe that the lower bounds of [GO96] do not hold
for online ORAM, Larsen and Nielsen [LN18] answer this open question by proving an amortized
Ω(logN) bandwidth overhead lower bound on the bandwidth of any online ORAM. Therefore, it
does not seem obvious how to use ORAM in the implementations of maximally hard ciMHFs.
6.2.1 Implementation and Analysis.
We require the hybrid in Figure 8 to argue that our implementation of Figure 4 is a ciMHF. The
hybrid in Figure 8 differs from the implementation of Figure 4 in Figure 7 in that the hidden input
key is used to index from the entire family of random permutations, rather than a pseudorandom
permutation. Thus the only way an adversary can distinguish between the hybrid and the real world
sampler is by distinguishing between a random permutation and a pseudorandom permutation. On
the other hand, if an adversary fails to distinguish between the hybrid and the real world sampler,
then the cumulative memory complexity of the implementation requires Ω(N2) since the leakage
pattern of the hybrid is statistically equivalent to the dMHF construction in Figure 4, where each
parent is chosen a priori using a permutation drawn uniformly at random.
Theorem 6.2 For each DAG G that is amenable to shuffling, there exists a computationally data-
independent sequential evaluation algorithm MHF.Eval(x;R) computing the function fG,H in time
O (N).
Proof : Consider the evaluation function in Figure 7. Observe that the hybrid in Figure 8 has the
same distribution of leakage patterns as the dMHF of Figure 4. Moreover, under the least recently
used (LRU) or first in first out (FIFO) cache eviction policies, if k is less than the size of the cache,
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Hybrid:
(1) Data-independent phase:
(a) Let G be a k-restricted dynamic graph with αN nodes for some constant α > 1 that
is amenable to shuffling, L be the last N nodes of G, and H be an arbitrary hash
function.
(b) Let K = Setup(1λ;R) be a hidden random permutation key for each computation
of fG,H(x), given the security parameter λ and random bits R.
(c) Recall that the subgraph induced by the first (α − 1)N nodes is a static graph.
Compute the label LG,H,x(v) for each node v ∈ (G− L).
(2) Shuffling phase:
(a) Since G is amenable to shuffling, L can be partitioned into groups G1, . . . , GN
k
that satisfy the definition of Definition 5.1. For each j ∈ [Nk ], let Oj =
PotentialParents(Gj).
(b) For each j ∈ [Nk ], shuffle the contents of Oj :
i. Let v1, . . . , vk be the vertices in Oj .
ii. Load the labels LG,H,x(v1), . . . , LG,H,x(vk) into cache.
iii. Shuffle the positions of LG,H,x(v1), . . . , LG,H,x(vk) so that for each p ∈ [k],
LG,H,x(vp) is in the location that previously corresponded to LG,H,x(vq), where
q = Enc(j ◦K, p), where Enc is a keyed truly random permutation of k.
(3) Data-dependent phase:
(a) For each j ∈ [Nk ], initialize an array Uj such that for all 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ k, Uj[ℓ] = ℓ.
(b) For each i = αN + 1 to (α+ 1)N :
i. Let j and s be defined so that 1 ≤ s ≤ k and 1 ≤ j ≤ Nk given i = αN + j +
(s− 1)Nk and let m = LG,H,x(i− 1) (mod k − s+ 1) + 1.
ii. Set r(i) = Uj[m] + (α − 1)N + 1 + jk so that r(i) ∈ Oj and load LG,H,x(r(i)).
(Recall that the label of r(i) is actually located at the position where the label
of node Enc(j ◦K,U [m]) was previously located prior to the shuffling.)
iii. Load LG,H,x(r(i)) and LG,H,x(i−1) and compute LG,H,x(i) = H(i◦LG,H,x(r(i))◦
LG,H,x(i− 1)).
iv. Let Uj[Uj [m]] = a and Uj[k − s+ 1] = b. Then swap the values of Uj at Uj [m]
and k − s+ 1 so that Uj [Uj [m]] = b and Uj[k − s+ 1] = a.
Fig. 8: Description of hybrid. Differs from Figure 7 in that the hidden input key is used to index
into the entire family of random permutations, rather than a pseudorandom permutation.
then all the shuffling can be performed so an attacker observing the leakage patterns of the hybrid
has no advantage in the data-independency game. Furthermore, the ciMHF implementation in
Figure 7 only differs from the hybrid in Figure 8 in the implementation of Enc as a pseudorandom
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permutation compared to a truly random permutation. Therefore, an attacker observing leakage
patterns from the implementation in Figure 7 only obtains a negligible advantage negl(λ) in the
security parameter λ, in the data-independency game. Hence, the implementation of Figure 7 is a
ciMHF. ✷
We now show that the evaluation function in Figure 7 of the dMHF in Figure 4 is a maximally
hard ciMHF.
Theorem 6.3 Let 0 < ǫ < 1 be a constant and k = Ω(N ǫ). Then there exists a family G of
k-restricted graphs with cc(G) = Ω(N2) that is amenable to shuffling. Moreover, there exists a
negligible value δ = negl(N) such that ccδ(G) = Ω(N
2).
Proof : Consider the evaluation function in Figure 7 of the dMHF in Figure 4. For the sake of
completeness, the full implementation is also shown in Figure 9. Since the construction of Figure 4
is amenable to shuffling, then the evaluation algorithm is a ciMHF by Theorem 6.2. Finally by
Theorem 5.3, cc(G) = Ω(N2).
In fact, Theorem 5.3 implies that for G ∈ G drawn uniformly at random and any pebbling
strategy S, not only is E
G∼G
[cc(S,G)] = Ω(N2), but also cc(S,G) = Ω(N2) with probability at least
1− cN/k for some constant 0 < c < 1. Thus for δ = 1− cN/k, we have cc(S,G, δ) = Ω(N2) for any
pebbling strategy S and so ccδ(G) = Ω(N
2). ✷
For the sake of completeness, we give the evaluation algorithm for the maximally hard ciMHF
in Figure 9.
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Computationally data-independent sequential evaluation algorithm MHF.Eval(x;R)
(1) Let H be an arbitrary hash function and K = Setup(1λ;R) be a hidden random permu-
tation key for each computation of fG,H(x), given the security parameter λ and random
bits R. Let k = Ω(N ǫ).
(2) Data-independent phase:
(a) G1 = grates2N,ǫ
(b) G2 = superconc(G1)
(c) G3 = gratesǫ(G2), which has αN total nodes, including 2N output nodes O =
O1 ∪ . . . ∪ON
k
, where Oj = [(α− 2)N + 1+ 2ik, (α − 2)N + 2(j + 1)k] for j ∈
[
N
k
]
.
(d) Compute the label LG3,H,x(v) for each node v ∈ G3.
(3) Shuffling phase:
(a) Let G be the graph G3 appended with N additional nodes, so that V = [(α+1)N ],
and edges (i− 1, i) for each αN + 1 ≤ i ≤ (α+ 1)N .
(b) For each j ∈ [Nk ], shuffle the contents of Oj :
i. Let v1, . . . , v2k be the vertices in Oj .
ii. Load the labels LG,H,x(v1), . . . , LG,H,x(v2k) into cache.
iii. Shuffle the positions of LG,H,x(v1), . . . , LG,H,x(v2k) so that for each p ∈ [2k],
LG,H,x(vp) is in the location that previously corresponded to LG,H,x(vq), where
q = Enc(j ◦K, p), where Enc is a keyed pseudorandom permutation of 2k.
(4) Data-dependent phase:
(a) For each j ∈ [Nk ], initialize an array Uj such that for all 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ 2k, Uj [ℓ] = ℓ.
(b) For each i = αN + 1 to (α+ 1)N :
i. Let j and s be defined so that 1 ≤ s ≤ k and 1 ≤ j ≤ Nk given i = αN + j +
(s− 1)Nk and let m = LG,H,x(i− 1) (mod 2k − s+ 1) + 1.
ii. Set r(i) = Uj [m] + (α− 2)N + 1 + 2jk so that r(i) ∈ Oj and load LG,H,x(r(i)).
(Recall that the label of r(i) is actually located at the position where the label
of node Enc(j ◦K,U [m]) was previously located prior to the shuffling.)
iii. Load LG,H,x(r(i)) and LG,H,x(i−1) and compute LG,H,x(i) = H(i◦LG,H,x(r(i))◦
LG,H,x(i− 1)).
iv. Let Uj [Uj [m]] = a and Uj[2k− s+1] = b. Then swap the values of Uj at Uj [m]
and 2k − s+ 1 so that Uj[Uj [m]] = b and Uj [2k − s+ 1] = a.
Fig. 9: Description of implementation of maximally hard ciMHF. Again note that each computation
of fG,H(x) requires as input random bits R to generate the leakage pattern.
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6.2.2 Extension to Multiple Rounds.
Finally, we show that our ciMHF implementation is robust to multiple rounds of leakage by con-
sidering a data independency game where an adversary is allowed to submit and observe multiple
adaptive queries before outputting a guess for the hidden challenge bit b. The game again consists
of the phases setup, challenge, and guess, which are described as follows.
Adaptive data independency game for ciMHF:
setup In this phase, A selects the security parameter λ and sends it to H. H then selects a
random bit b ∈ {0, 1}.
challenge For each round i = 1, 2, . . ., A chooses two adaptive query messages xi,0 and xi,1
and sends the query messages to H. H selects random coins Ri,0, Ri,1 ∈ {0, 1}λ uniformly
at random, samples lpi,0 ← LP(MHF.Eval(xi,0;Ri,0)) and lpi,1 ← LP(MHF.Eval(xi,1;Ri,1)),
and sends the ordered pair (lpi,b, lpi,1−b) to A. Note: A can pick xi+1,0 and xi+1,1 adap-
tively after observing the response (lpi,b, lpi,1−b).
guess The game ends when the adversary A outputs b′ as a guess for b. A wins the game if
b = b′.
As before, the advantage of the adversary to win the adaptive data independency game for
ciMHF is:
Advind−mult−lp−iMHFA,MHF =
∣∣∣∣12 −Pr [A(T ) = b′ : b = b′)]
∣∣∣∣ ,
where T is the transcript {xi,0, xi,1, lpi,b, lpi,1−b} and lpi,j = LP(xi,j ;MHF.Eval(xi,j;Ri,j)).
Definition 6.4 We say an evaluation algorithm MHF.Eval has (t, ǫ)-single security if any attacker
running in time t has at most advantage ǫ in the data independency game. Similarly, we say an
evaluation algorithm MHF.Eval has (t, r, ǫ)-adaptive security if any attacker running in time t and
making r queries has at most advantage ǫ in the adaptive data independency game.
We conclude by noting the following relationship between single security and adaptive security,
thus implying the security of our evaluation function in Figure 7 of the dMHF in Figure 4 with
respect to the adaptive data independency game.
Theorem 6.5 (t, ǫ)-single security implies (t−O (r · time(MHF.Eval)) , r, rǫ)-adaptive security.
Proof : Suppose that Aadaptive violates (t − O (r · time(MHF.Eval)) , r, rǫ)-adaptive security for
the sake of contradiction. Without loss of generality we will assume that Aadaptive outputs b
′ = b
with probability greater than 12 + rǫ. We will use Aadaptive to construct an attacker Asingle that
violates (t, ǫ)-single security.
We first define a sequence of r hybrids in the adaptive data-independency game. In Hybrid i,
the challenger H picks bits b, b1, . . . , bi−1 uniformly at random and sets bi = b, bi+1 = b, . . . , br =
b. In round j when the attacker Aadaptive submits two strings xj,0 and xj,1, the challenger H
samples lpj,0 ← LP(MHF.Eval(xj,0;Rj,0)) and lpj,1 ← LP(MHF.Eval(xj,1;Rj,1)) and then responds
with lpj,bi , lpj,1−bi instead of lpj,b and lpj,1−b i.e., the bit bi is used to permute the order of the
responses in round i instead of b.
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Observe that in Hybrid 1, b1 = . . . = br = b, so that Hybrid 1 is equivalent to the actual adaptive
independency game. Similarly, in Hybrid r, the bits b1, . . . , br are all picked independently so that
Aadaptive working in Hybrid r has no advantage i.e., the attacker guesses b
′ = b correctly with
probability at most Pr [b′ = b | Hybrid r] = 12 . We observe that the advantage of the attacker is
Pr
[
b′ = b | Hybrid 1]− 1
2
= Pr
[
b′ = b | Hybrid 1]−Pr [b′ = b | Hybrid r] = ∆2 + . . . +∆r ,
where ∆i = Pr [b
′ = b | Hybrid i− 1]−Pr [b′ = b | Hybrid i]. By an averaging argument, we must
have ∆i+1 > ǫ for some i < r. The following observation will also be useful:
∆i+1 =
1
2
Pr
[
b′ = b | Hybrid i]− 1
2
Pr
[
b = b′ | Hybrid i+ 1, bi 6= b
]
.
Reduction. We now define Asingle as follows: (1) Asingle simulates Aadaptive along with the adap-
tive challenger Hadaptive. Asingle generates random bits b1, . . . , bi−1 and sets bi+1 = . . . = br = b′′ for
another random bit b′′. In each round j 6= i, when Aadaptive outputs a query xj,0, xj,1, our attacker
Asingle simply computes lpi,0 ← LP(MHF.Eval(xi,0;Ri,0)) and lpi,1 ← LP(MHF.Eval(xi,1;Ri,1)) and
responds with lpi,bi , lpi,1−bi . When Aadaptive outputs the query xi,0, xi,1 in round i, Asingle forwards
this query to the challenger for the single stage challenger Hsingle and receives back lpi,b, lpi,1−b for
an unknown bit b selected by Hsingle. Finally, when Aadaptive outputs a guess b′ (for b′′) Asingle
outputs the same guess b′ (for b).
Analysis. Notice that since b′′ is just a bit selected uniformly at random and independent from
b, then Pr [b′ = b′′ |b′′ = b] = Pr [b′ = b′′ | Hybrid i]. Then from the above observation, we have
Pr [b′ = b′′ |b′′ 6= b] = Pr [b′ = b′′ | Hybrid i+ 1, bi 6= b′′] = Pr [b′ = b′′| Hybrid i]−2∆i+1. It follows
that Pr [b′ = b′′ | b′′ = b]−Pr [b′ = b′′ |b′′ 6= b] = 2∆i+1. Thus, the probability that Asingle wins is
Pr
[
b′ = b
]
= Pr
[
b′′ = b
]
Pr
[
b′ = b′′ | b′′ = b]+Pr [b′′ 6= b] (1−Pr [b′ = b′′ |b′′ 6= b])
=
1
2
+ ∆i+1 > ǫ.
Furthermore, the running time of Asingle is at most t. This contradicts the assumption that the
evaluation algorithm MHF.Eval has (t, ǫ)-single security. Therefore, (t, ǫ)-single security implies
(t−O (r · time(MHF.Eval)) , r, rǫ)-adaptive security.
✷
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank anonymous ITCS 2020 reviewers for thorough feedback on this paper. This
research was supported in part by the National Science Foundation under award #1755708 and
by IARPA under the HECTOR program. This work was done in part while Samson Zhou was a
postdoctoral fellow at Indiana University.
27
References
[AB16] Joe¨l Alwen and Jeremiah Blocki. Efficiently computing data-independent memory-hard
functions. In Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2016 - 36th Annual International
Cryptology Conference, Proceedings, Part II, pages 241–271, 2016.
[AB17] Joe¨l Alwen and Jeremiah Blocki. Towards practical attacks on argon2i and balloon
hashing. In 2017 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy, EuroS&P,
pages 142–157, 2017.
[ABH17] Joe¨l Alwen, Jeremiah Blocki, and Benjamin Harsha. Practical graphs for optimal
side-channel resistant memory-hard functions. In Proceedings of the ACM SIGSAC
Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS, pages 1001–1017, 2017.
[ABMW05] Mart´ın Abadi, Michael Burrows, Mark S. Manasse, and Ted Wobber. Moderately hard,
memory-bound functions. ACM Trans. Internet Techn., 5(2):299–327, 2005.
[ABP17] Joe¨l Alwen, Jeremiah Blocki, and Krzysztof Pietrzak. Depth-robust graphs and their
cumulative memory complexity. In Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2017 -
36th Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic
Techniques, Proceedings, Part III, pages 3–32, 2017.
[ACP+17] Joe¨l Alwen, Binyi Chen, Krzysztof Pietrzak, Leonid Reyzin, and Stefano Tessaro.
Scrypt is maximally memory-hard. In Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT - 36th
Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic
Techniques, Proceedings, Part III, pages 33–62, 2017.
[AS15] Joe¨l Alwen and Vladimir Serbinenko. High parallel complexity graphs and memory-
hard functions. In Proceedings of the Forty-Seventh Annual ACM on Symposium on
Theory of Computing, STOC, 2015.
[BCS16] Dan Boneh, Henry Corrigan-Gibbs, and Stuart E. Schechter. Balloon hashing: A
memory-hard function providing provable protection against sequential attacks. In
Advances in Cryptology - ASIACRYPT 2016 - 22nd International Conference on the
Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security, Proceedings, Part I,
pages 220–248, 2016.
[BDK15] Alex Biryukov, Daniel Dinu, and Dmitry Khovratovich. Fast and tradeoff-resilient
memory-hard functions for cryptocurrencies and password hashing. IACR Cryptology
ePrint Archive, 2015:430, 2015.
[BDK16] Alex Biryukov, Daniel Dinu, and Dmitry Khovratovich. Argon2: New generation of
memory-hard functions for password hashing and other applications. In IEEE European
Symposium on Security and Privacy, EuroS&P, pages 292–302, 2016.
[Ber05] Daniel J Bernstein. Cache-timing attacks on aes, 2005.
[BHK+19] Jeremiah Blocki, Benjamin Harsha, Siteng Kang, Seunghoon Lee, Lu Xing, and Sam-
son Zhou. Data-independent memory hard functions: New attacks and stronger con-
structions. In Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2019 - 39th Annual International
Cryptology Conference, Proceedings, Part II, pages 573–607, 2019.
28
[BHZ18] Jeremiah Blocki, Benjamin Harsha, and Samson Zhou. On the economics of offline
password cracking. In 2018 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, SP 2018,
Proceedings, pages 853–871, 2018.
[BLZ19] Jeremiah Blocki, Seunghoon Lee, and Samson Zhou. Approximating cumulative peb-
bling cost is unique games hard. CoRR, abs/1904.08078, 2019.
[BN16] Elette Boyle and Moni Naor. Is there an oblivious RAM lower bound? In Proceedings
of the 2016 ACM Conference on Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science, pages
357–368, 2016.
[Bon12] Joseph Bonneau. The science of guessing: Analyzing an anonymized corpus of 70
million passwords. In 2012 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 538–552,
San Francisco, CA, USA, May 21–23,” 2012. IEEE Computer Society Press.
[Boy07] Xavier Boyen. Halting password puzzles: Hard-to-break encryption from human-
memorable keys. In Proceedings of the 16th USENIX Security Symposium, 2007.
[BRZ18] Jeremiah Blocki, Ling Ren, and Samson Zhou. Bandwidth-hard functions: Reductions
and lower bounds. In Proceedings of the ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and
Communications Security, CCS, pages 1820–1836, 2018.
[BZ17] Jeremiah Blocki and Samson Zhou. On the depth-robustness and cumulative pebbling
cost of argon2i. In Theory of Cryptography - 15th International Conference, TCC,
Proceedings, Part I, pages 445–465, 2017.
[BZ18] Jeremiah Blocki and Samson Zhou. On the computational complexity of minimal
cumulative cost graph pebbling. In Financial Cryptography and Data Security - 22nd
International Conference, FC, Revised Selected Papers, pages 329–346, 2018.
[DN92] Cynthia Dwork and Moni Naor. Pricing via processing or combatting junk mail. In
Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO ’92, 12th Annual International Cryptology Con-
ference, Proceedings, pages 139–147, 1992.
[FLW14] Christian Forler, Stefan Lucks, and Jakob Wenzel. Memory-demanding password
scrambling. In Advances in Cryptology - ASIACRYPT - 20th International Conference
on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security, Proceedings,
Part II, pages 289–305, 2014.
[GO96] Oded Goldreich and Rafail Ostrovsky. Software protection and simulation on oblivious
rams. J. ACM, 43(3):431–473, 1996.
[JAA+15] Marcos A. Simpl´ıcio Jr., Leonardo C. Almeida, Ewerton R. Andrade, Paulo C. F. dos
Santos, and Paulo S. L. M. Barreto. Lyra2: Password hashing scheme with improved
security against time-memory trade-offs. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, page 136,
2015.
[LN18] Kasper Green Larsen and Jesper Buus Nielsen. Yes, there is an oblivious RAM lower
bound! In Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2018 - 38th Annual International
Cryptology Conference, Proceedings, Part II, pages 523–542, 2018.
29
[LT82] Thomas Lengauer and Robert Endre Tarjan. Asymptotically tight bounds on time-
space trade-offs in a pebble game. J. ACM, 29(4):1087–1130, 1982.
[Per09] Colin Percival. Stronger key derivation via sequential memory-hard functions, 2009.
[Pip77] Nicholas Pippenger. Superconcentrators. SIAM J. Comput., 6(2):298–304, 1977.
[RD17] Ling Ren and Srinivas Devadas. Bandwidth hard functions for ASIC resistance. In
Theory of Cryptography - 15th International Conference, TCC 2017, Proceedings, Part
I, pages 466–492, 2017.
[Sch83] Georg Schnitger. On depth-reduction and grates. In 24th Annual Symposium on
Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), pages 323–328, 1983.
[SvDS+18] Emil Stefanov, Marten van Dijk, Elaine Shi, T.-H. Hubert Chan, Christopher W.
Fletcher, Ling Ren, Xiangyao Yu, and Srinivas Devadas. Path ORAM: an extremely
simple oblivious RAM protocol. J. ACM, 65(4):18:1–18:26, 2018.
[Val77] Leslie G. Valiant. Graph-theoretic arguments in low-level complexity. In Mathematical
Foundations of Computer Science 1977, 6th Symposium, Proceedings, pages 162–176,
1977.
30
